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POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPME...~

Much of the concern about the effect of population size and its rate
of growth on economic development is based on the simple idea that first,
the more the number sharing the current flow of goods and services the
less there will be for each, and second, the more the number and faster
its rate of growth, the less of capital (human and physical) will be
accumulated and hence, smaller will be the future flow of goods and
services.

In this view, the process of population growth is exogenous to

the processes of income generation, accumulation, technical progress and
institutional change. Once it is recognized that fertility decisions are
made by households who are concerned about the welfare of their progeny
and who respond to the relevant market prices, opportunities for
productive use of their resources ·and public policy signals, population
growth is seen to be endogenous.

Unless externalities associated with

private fertility decisions are pervasive and significant, no policy
intervention in those decisions will be called for.

An examination of

possible externalities from the point of view of resource (exhaustible and
renewable) use over time, capital accumulation, distribution of income
within and between generations etc. suggests that many of the alleged
deleterious consequences result more from inappropriate policies and
institutions than from rapid population growth.

Once the appropriate

institutional framework and undistorted markets are in place, there is
little scope for population policy as such.

POPUI.ATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

1.

INTRODUCTION

The influence of the size and rate of growth of population on the
development prospects of developing countries has continued to attract the
attention of economists, demographers and social scientists in general.
The perceptions about this influence have varied over time from extreme
pessimism to optimism and all positions in between.

However, the

accumulation of knowledge on the various factors that determine the
fertility decisions of households and their consequences has led to a more
informed view in recent years.

Two influential studies are worth

mentioning in this connection.

The first is the World Development Report

of the.World Bank devoted to the population issues and published in 1984.
The second is a report of the Working Group on Population Growth and
Economic Development of the National Aca~emy of Sciences (National
Research Council 1986).

Population and Development Review published a

review symposium in September 1986 on this report to which A. C. Kelley,

J. L. Simon, J. E. Potter and H. E. Daly contributed.

Paul Demeny's

(1986) presidential address to the Population Association of America was
i~ part a forceful critique of the report.

In addition, there have been

surveys by McNicoll (1984), Kelley (1984), and Birdsall (1987).

Schultz

(1985, 1987), Pollak (1985) and Willis (1986) have discussed particular
aspects of population growth and the approach to analysing the
determinants of fertility.

It is very difficult to add to these in terms

of !1fil! substantive research conclusions.

I will attempt only to highlight

some of the issues discussed in the literature from analytical and policy
perspectives.

There will be very little discussion of facts, models and
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economet ric analyses of issues relating to populatio n growth in the
expectati on that other papers in this symposium will adequatel y address
them.
At an elementar y level the concern about populatio n size could be put
very simply:

the more the number sharing the current flow of goods and

services the less there will be for each.

Equally, more the number and

faster its rate of growth, the less per head will be accumula ted over time
of capital and other resources and hence, smaller will be the future flow
of goods and services.

Thus, in this view a large populatio n size has a

purely a negative influence : it reduces the slice of a given cake that
each individua l will be able to enjoy and the growth in the size of the
, cake itself.

Even at this elementar y level it is easy to see that this

assertion could be erroneous .

First of all, the rate of growth of

populatio n is not exogenous to the process of economic developm ent-
househol d's fertility decisions a~e influence d by the opportun ities for
productiv e use of their resources , in particula r the use of time and of
savings that successfu l developme nt brings about.

Second, the size of the

cake and its rate of growth through technical change and factor
accumula tion are themselve s likely to be influence d by the size of the
populatio n in a positive way.· And indeed some writers, such as Julian
Simon (1981), point to this very possibili ty to argue against the earlier
perceptio n of populatio n growth as a problem.
Even if the size of populatio n does not positivel y influence the
process of technical change, there may still be an argument that, other
things being equal, larger populatio n itself contribut es to social
welfare.

One strand of this argument is that from the perspecti ve of

defending a nation against its enemies, the larger populatio n size is of
some advantage .

.

For example, Nerlove et al (1987, p. 82) quote Edgeworth
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as referring to the view that larger population may be desirable, not only
as an end to itself, but also for the sake of defense against competition
with foreign nations, and that these considerations have perhaps the first
claim on the attention of the statesmen; "being must be secured before
well-being."

They also generalize Edgeworth's argument by suggesting that

a larger population has an advantage in providing pure public goods, of
which national defense is only one example, because the per capita cost of
providing a public good falls as the population becomes larger.
Even if one were to accept that the population size and its rate of
growth may influence social welfare, there still remains the question
whether individual households, through their own choice of fertility
subject to whatever constraints that they may face, would bring about
socially optimal size and rate of growth of population.
the question of the population policy does not arise.

If they do, then
Thus, in assessing

the relevance of population considerations from a social point of view,
no~ only one has to assess the evidence for the positive or negative
effects, but also whether these effects are external to the decisions of
individual households.

However, even if individual households are

altruistic in taking into consideration the welfare of their progeny, and
even if externalities are absent, still there may be room for policy

i~tervention if for some reason it was thought that the social welfare
considerations differed from individual welfare assessments, particularly

with respect to the weight to be given to the welfare of the unborn future
generations.

In a static world with given size of population and absence of
externalities, it is well-known that at a
allocation of resources is pareto optimal.

competitive equilibrium the
Such an allocation, however,

may or may not maximize an individualistic social welfare function
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(SWF).1

Analogously, in the choice of fertility, unrestricted equilibrium

may be pareto optimal, but not necessarily social welfare maximizing.
However, with fertility endogenous, even the concept of inter-generational
pareto optimality is problematic because the pareto criterion is not well
suited for welfare comparisons of equilibria with different numbers of
people. The interested reader may wish to consult Dasgupta (1985) and
Nerlove et al (1987) for a discussion of the issues relating to the choice
of social welfare functions and the philosophical problems underlying
their choice, in the context of population growth.
In what follows the analytical and empirical knowledge relating to
the impact of population size and growth on the allocation of exhaustible,

1

'renewable and accumulated resources will be reviewed.

Second, the likely'

influence of population growth on rates of technical change, accumulation
of human capital and on the distribution of income within and between
generations will be examined.

In the concluding section, the vexing

question whether there is any argument for public intervention in
household fertility decisions and the nature of such interventions will be
discussed.

2.

EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCEs2
In assessing the impact of population and growth on exhaustible

resources, it is instructive to begin by assuming that the resource
requirement per person is some fixed number.

If the total available

resource stock is also fixed, then it is clear the two together determine
the total number of individuals that can enjoy this stock of resources. As
such, changes in rate of growth of population will only affect the time
pattern of the use of this resources without affecting the total number of
persons that will eventually use up the stock.

If this resource is vital
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for human existence, the world is bound to come to an end, sooner if the
population rate of growth is more rapid or later if it is less rapid.
However, once we get away from this extreme assumption that the resource
requirement is fixed (so that by definition nothing else can be
substituted for it) and allow for potential substitutes, then the problem
resource exhaustion takes on a different complexion altogether.

First, as

a particular resource stock gets exhausted, the relative price of that
resource would go up, inducing substitution of other resources for it and
ultimately affecting fertility choice itself.

Second, the rising price of

a resource will also induce the search for substitutes, the success of
~hich will extend the potential population that can be sustained.
There is ample empirical evidence that resource exhaustion is not a
major constraint on global economic growth, at least as yet.

The material

input per unit of GNP seems to be declining over the long haul.

There

appears to be a significant decline in real cost of resources (Simon,
1981, Appendix) at least until recently.

Nordhaus (1986) reports that

real oil prices in America stood in mid-1986 at almost exactly the same
level as in 1900!

As long as the international markets for resources

function well and the access to such markets are not restricted, the fact
that some countries (e.g. Japan) are not well endowed with natural
resources has not constrained their growth.

Nordhaus' calculations, based

on a. simple aggregative growth model, lead him to conclude that even for
countries that import all their resource requirements, the drag on the
growth rate, induced by rising real resource costs, is likely to be
modest--a few hundredths of a percent per annum.
It is sometimes argued that by slowing the rate of population
growth one can postpone the exhaustion of currently available resources so
that more time is available for the development of substitutes.

This is
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not an entirely convincing argument.

After all, the returns to the

development of substitutes depend on their prices. To the extent these
prices reach a particular level later because of slower exhaustion of
existing resources, it can only postpone the development of substitutes
rather than accelerate their development.

On the other hand, if one is

referring to the development of as yet unknown substitutes, the search for
such materials is also motivated by potential returns from successful
search, once again the previous argument applies.

But if one is talking

about exogenous technological breakthroughs, then by definition their
timing is not influenced by the developments elsewhere in the economy, and
~s such, changes in population rates of growth cannot influence the
timing.

Be that as it may, the global use of exhaustible resources are

primarily driven by income grow_th rather than by population growth.

Even

if the rate of growth of population is halted, with the desirable
increases in the low levels of income in developing countries coming about
through their economic development, their demands on resources would
increase anywa,y.

3.

RENEW'ABLE RESOURCES
One of the major renewable resources, whose flow is allegedly made

unduly scarce by rapid population growth, particularly in developing
countries, is food, or more precisely the services of arable land.

A

purely technical approach to this problem would be to put together an
estimate of what the earth can produce in terms of food and divide that
estimate by the requirement of food per person to arrive at a globl
carrying capacity. If this global carrying capacity exceeds any likely
future global population, then by definition there is no limit to
population growth arising from constraints of the availability of food.

..

A
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study along these lines was undertaken jointly by the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Fund
for Population Activities (UNFPA) and the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA).
The objectives of the study were " ... to ascertain on the basis of
land resource inventories, the potential population supporting capacities
in the developing world with various levels of inputs.

And, second, to

compare these estimates with data on present and projected populations ... "
(Higgins et al, 1983, p. 5).
Shah et al (1984).

Some of the earlier studies are reviewed in

Their estimates of population potential varied

depending on variations in each of the three inputs: estimates of arable
land, yield per hectare and per capita consumption needs.

The range was

enormous: from a low estimate of 902 million by Pearson and Harper in 1945
to 147 billion by Clark in 1967 (Shah et al, 1984, p. 5)!

The

FAO-UNFPA-IIASA study differs from the earlier studies in its use of a
more disaggregated data base and superior methodology.

Briefly stated, it

uses an overlay of a climate map providing spatial information on
temperature and moisture conditions on to a soil map providing spatial
data on soil texture, slope and phase.

This resulted in dividing the

study area into grids, each covering an area of 100 square kilometers
area.

In all, 14 major climates during growth period were distinguished

with ·normal (i.e. containing a humid period) length of the growing period
(LGP) divided into 13 intervals and intermediate (with no humid period)
LGP being divided into six intervals.

Fifteen most widely grown food

crops, namely, wheat, rice, maize, barley, sorghum, pearl millet, white
potato, sweet potato, cassava, phaselous bean, soybean, groundnut, sugar
cane, bananas/planta in and oil palm were considered.

Three alternative

levels of farm technology (low, intermediate and high) varying from no
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change in existing cropping patterns, no use of fertilizers and pesticides
and no mechanization to optimum use of plant genetic potential, along with
needed fertilizers and pesticides and full mechanization are postulated.
The soil characteristic , climate, growing season length, technology
and cropping pattern, together with the requirement that production be
sustainable (i.e. that appropriate fallowing requirements and soil
conservation measures are allowed for), determine the production potential

in each of the soil-climate grids.

These are then aggregated to yield

production potential at the level of a country.

After deduction of seed,

feed and wastage one then obtains the crop-wise potential output available
for human consumption.

Livestock production potential was also assessed,

both under the assumption that only grassland will be used to support
herds, and under the assumption crop residues and by-products will be used
as well (Shah et al 1984, p. 32).

Given the average energy (measured in

kilo calories per day) and protein (in grams per day) requirements based
on the 1973 recommendation s of an expert committee of FAO and World Health
Organization (WHO) and the age and sex distribution of the population of a
country and the production available for human consumption in terms of
energy-and protein, the maximum population that can be supported can be
determined.

The results are shown in Table 1.

In this table "critical"

countries are the ones that cannot meet the basic food needs of their
population even if all their arable land were devoted to growing food
crops, and "limited" countries are the ones that cannot meet these needs
if part of their arable land has to be diverted to produce other food and
non-food cash crops.

Finally, "surplus" countries are the ones that meet

their food as well as other non-food requirements.
It should be noted that the population carrying capacity, reported in
Table 1 for "limited" countries, is the population that can be sustained
6.
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Table 1
Population Carrying Capacities (Million)

Level of Farming Technology
Region

I.

Africa
Number of Critical Countries
Limited Countries
Surplus Countries
Population Carrying Ca2acity of:
Critical Countries
Limited Countries
Surplus Countries
All Countries

Low

29
4
18

High

Intermediate

4
4

12

7
32

43

209 (466)
.68 (62)
977 (252)

340 (258)
4087 (412)

9 (11)
70 (52)
12789 (717)

1254 (780)

4489 (780)

12868 (780)

62 (110)

II. Southwest Asia

Number of:Critical Countries
Limited Countries
Surplus Countries
!2J!ul~tion Carryir.g Ca~acity of:
Critical Countries
Limiteg_ Countries
Surplus Countries
All Countries

14
1

14

11

3
1

1

87 (195)
93 (69)
180 (264)

121 (69)

47 (89)
118 (106)
159 (69)

237 (264)

324 (264)

116 (195)

III. Southeast Asia
Number of Critical Countrie·s
Limited Countries
Surplus Countries
Population Carrying Capacity of:
.Critical Countries
Limited Countries
Surplus Countries
All Countries

6
4
6

2

1
1

14

14

270 (341)
1492 (1190)
702 (407)

4210 (1782)

185 (153)
6149 (1782)

2464 (1938)

4358 (1938)

6334 (1938)

148

(156)

(3)
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if all arable land was devoted to crop production and this exceeds their
projected population in year 2000.

However, if a third of all land is

assumed to be devoted to other crops and the carrying capacity
correspondingly reduced by a third, the projected population (by year
2000) of these countries will exceed the reduced carrying capacity.
is why they are listed under the category "limited."

This

Since in many

countries of the developing world population will still be growing in year
2000, Shah et al (1984) compare population carrying capacity with the
hypothetical size of stationary population.

In this comparison, even with

a high level of technology, eleven countries cannot support the size of
~heir stationary population, the most populous among them being Bangladesh
, which is expected to reach a stationary population of 430 million in year··
2035.

Eight countries can support their stationary population only at a

high level of technology, but of the most populous among them, namely
Nigeria, the balance between carrying capacity (701 million) and
stationary population (623 million) is too close for comfort.
Yet anot~er study of this nature is by Bernard Gilland (1983).

By

multiplying an assumed maximum yield of 5 tons of grain equivalent per
hectare and an assumed (indefinitely sustainable) availability of 1.5
billion hectares of land, he obtains a maximum global output of 7.5
billion tons of grain equivalent. Gilland's assumption that "a completely
satisfactory" diet including some meat will involve an average daily total
intake (direct and indirect through livestock products) of 9000 kilo
calories per capita of "plant energy" leads him to conclude that the earth
can support 7.5 billion people.

A projected stationary population of

roughly 11.~ billion people can be supported at a consumption about 6000
kilo calories per capita.
What inference can one draw from such studies?

It would appear that
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there is technological capability and land resources to sustain a
population of as high as 33 billion (or nearly 9 times the projected
population of 3.6 billion in year 2000) in the five regions of the world
included in the FAO-IIASA study.

But this by itself is no cause for

complacency since there is virtually no economic analysis underlying these
projections, even though their data base and assumptions regarding
technology are considerably more sophisticated and far more spatially
disaggregated than any of the earlier studies of the same genre.

Since

farming is done by millions of individual peasants, unless it is in their
private economic interest, given the prices for inputs and outputs they
face and the constraints to which they are subject, they will not produce
a particular set and levels of crop outputs merely because it is
agro-climatieally and technoloically feasible to produce it. ·In
particular, the investments in land; capital equipment, livestock,
technical skills and knowledge needed to attain the potential output will
not be forthcoming unless the returns are adequate.

By asking whether

each country or region within a country has the potential to sustain its
projected year 2000 or its stationary population, one completely ignores
the economic cost of such autarkic development even if it were feasible to
do so.

Thus, fundamental ideas of comparative advantage and gains from

trade between regions within a country and between countries are
conspicuous by their absence in such analyses.

At best these studies are

useful in pinpointing countries where, with a technology which raises the
output per unit of land to the fullest extent, even current level of
population cannot be sustained relying solely on home production.

This

may be taken as indicating the need for out-migration of a part of its
population or for investment in production for exports to pay for food
imports or some combination of both.
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Besides the population carrying capacity study, IIASA also engaged in
a major research project on food and agriculture .

This project built a

system of sequential general equilibrium models (Parikh and Rabar (1981).
These included 19 individual country models and three regional models (the
European Community, Eastern Europe, including USUR and a residual rest of
the world.

The models were linked into a global trading system, in which

the world markets for the ten aggregate commodities (9 agricultura l and
one non-agricu ltural) cleared to determine the time path of equilibrium
world prices.

Depending on the trade policy pursued by each country, the

domestic prices can differ from world prices to a greater or lesser
extent.

The linked system of models were intended mainly to analyze the

· implication s of liberalized agricultura l trade and to explore possible
national and internation al policies for alleviating hunger in the
developing world.

In these models, the growth of population until the

year 2000 was assumed to follow the medium projections of the United
Nations.

The simulations suggest that given the exogenously specified

real income and population growth in the countries and regions of the
model, the global agricultura l system can meet the effective demands
placed on it till 2000 without significant changes in relative prices.
While there is some reduction -in the proportion of the global population
that is hungry by year 2000 mainly due to projected income growth,
policies, such as liberalizat ion of agricultura l trade etc, that do not
involve global redistribut ion of incomes or assets do not significant ly
affect the number of hungry persons.
The India model of the IIASA linked system was, however, used to·
simulate the effects of varying the rate of growth of India's population
between 1980 and 2000.

I~ is more elaborate than others in the system in

that it distinguish es five income (more precisely, per capita real

-12-

consumption expenditure) groups among rural and urban populations with the
groups nwnbered according to increasing affluence (i.e. group 1 is the
poorest and group 5 is the richest in both rural and urban areas).

Each

group has its own demand function represented by a Stone-Geary linear
expenditure system and the distribution of aggregate consumer expenditure
among groups is assumed to be log-normal.

In this model population growth

is exogenously specified and influences only the demand module.

Three

alternative growth paths were specified: Alternative 1 corresponds to
IIASA's reference projection, Alternative 2 corresponds to the standard
projections for year 200 and Alterntive 3 corresponds to the rapid
)

fertility decline and standard mortality decline projection of the World
Bank (1984).

There is a difference of 121 million between the projections

of Alternative 1 and 3 by year 2000.

The model was run in a stand-alone

mode with the time path of the international price vector faced by India
exogenously specified to be the same as that emerging as the equilibrium
path in the Linked reference run.

For the reason that population

influences only per capita income and demand and not the production
process, the differenc~s between the alternatives are not large (see Table
2).

As is to be expected, Alternative 3 with the slowest population

growth leads to a minuscule speeding up in the rate of growth of real GDP.
However, the impact on energy intake and in the distribution of population
among expenditure groups is more perceptible.

In general, for all groups

energy intake increases as population growth decreases, and the
distribution of income improves as a higher proportion of the population
move to richer expenditure classes, particularly in the urban areas.

But

the changes associated with a smaller population size are modest.
The recent famines in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa have led some
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Table 2
Projections from India Model of IIASA
Alternative 1
1.

Population
(Millions)

1980
1990

2000

Alternative 2

Alternative 3

674
843
1048

672
818
995

670
788
927

2.

Rate of Growth
of Population
(% per year)

1971-2000
1980-2000
1990-2000

2.249
2.232
2.206

2.057
1.980
1.980

1.808
1.637
1.637

3.

late of Growth
of Real GDP
(% per year)

1971-2000
1980-2000
1990-2000

4.746
5.349
6.077

4.752
5.356
6.090

4.756
5.363
6.100

4.

Production of Wheat
(Million Metric tons)

1980
1990
2000

33
57
85

33
57
84

33
57
83

5.

Production of Rice
(Million Metric tons)

1980
1990
2000

47
68
92

47
68
92

47
68
92

6.

Production of Coarse
Grains (Million Metric
tons)

1980
1990
2000

26
32
35

26
32
34

26
32
34

7.

Production of all
Grains
(Million Metric tons)

1980
1990
2000

106
157
212

106
157
210

106
157
209

8.

Daily Calorie Intake
A. Rural Group 1
2
3

4

5

3
4

5

lource:

Jame as for Table 6.

1990
2000
1990
2000
1990
200Q
1990
2000
1990
2000

1018(28)*
1111(20)
1958(17)
2125(16)
2584(19)
2840(20)
2659(20)
2927(23)
3789(17)
3911(22)

1024(27)
1152(18)
1959(17)
2159(16)
2588(19)
2872(20)
2674(20)
2937(23)
3837(17)
4013(23)

1030
1183
1961
2184
2591
2897
2693
2988
3898
4174

(20)
(20)
(23)
(18)
(25)

1990
2000
19,0
2000
1990
2000
1990
2000
1990
2000

1170(2.1)
1173(0.5)
1654(5.7)
1689(3.4)
2029(17)
-2040(13)
2379(35)
2352(34)
3102(41)
3010(49)

1172(1.0)

1217(0.4)
1657(5.3)
1726(2.9)
2039(16)
2073(12)
2396(35)
2397(33)
3145(43)
3091(51)

1178
l.261
1664
1766
2052
2115
2419
2456
3200
3209

(0. 9)
(0.3)
(4.9)
(2.3)
(15)
(11)
(34)
(32)
(44)
(55)

{26)
(16)
(17)
(15)
09)

·l~

Fi,;;ures in parentheses denote the popul.':1.tion of each class
of the relevant total population.

;:J.S

a riror,crtion
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to point to the rapid growth in population there as one of the major
contributory causes. Rapid desertification, in part due to the abandonment
of the traditional methods of cultivation and livestock management, shift

of cropping patterns in favour of export crops, etc. have been attributed
to population pressure (Talbot (1986).

However, it is becoming

increasingly cl~ar (Lele and Meyers (1986), Williams (1984)) that
inappropriate government policies rather than population growth are
largely responsible for the African tragedy.
Another important renewable resource is the natural environment.

It

is asserted that rapid population growth will accelerate the degradation
pf natural environment.

There are two separate points to be made here.

First, a number of serious environmental degradation problems arise from
the production and consumption of commodities which are not only highly
income elastic but also have environmental side effects.

And, as in the

case of exhaustible resources, the contribution of the growth of
population per se to exacerbating this problem is not dominant.

The

second point ts that almost by definition many of the environmental
problems arise from externalities that are not reflected in the private
production and consumption decisions.

As is well-known, with an

appropriately defined property rights and a suitably defined set of taxes
and subsidies the externalities could be internalised.

It is argued that

· the use of fossil fuels in developing countries exacerbates the carbon
dioxide accumulation.

Also, the deforestation associated with extension

of food cultivation and use of firewood as fuel allegedly has led to
changes in climatic conditions and soil erosion.

Apart from the fact that

the quantitative· estimates of th~ extent of such.degradation are extremely
unreliable and their alleged negative effects, even if they are
significant, questionable, once again, with a well-defined system of
6

_

property rights and taxation, the negative effects could be contained.

In
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any case, the contribution of population growth to this phenomenon is
exaggerated.

4.

CAPITAL ACCUMUI.ATION, TECHNICAL CHANGE AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
It has been claimed that rapid population growth diverts resources

away from saving and toward current consumption through several channels
(Coale and Hoover (1958)).

A more rapid rate of growth of population

leads to a larger share of children in total population.

This is viewed

as inducing households to consume a larger proportion of their income than·
they otherwise would have done.
,

A second channel is through public

expenditure on education and health.

Once again, it is argued that.

greater the proportion of children in the population, greater is the
demand for education and health expenditures.

With a given total budget

these divert public resources from investment in physical capital.

Yet

another channel through which rapid population growth affects accumulation
is through lower level of capital per worker in a steady state, thus
reducing the level of steady state per capita consumption.

A rough

quantitative estimate of this effect can be obtained with a neo-classical
growth model in which aggregate output is produced with a Cobb-Douglas
production function. If capital owners do not consume and workers do not
save, and if population and labor force grow at the same rate, then the
elasticity of steady-state per capita consumption with respect to the rate
of growth of population is -a:/1-a:,where a: is the elasticity of output with
respect to capital.

With a:= 0.25, this elasticity is a modest -0.33.

If the decision regarding childbearing is not viewed as exogenous but
subject to choice, then the fact that some societies or households have
more children and less of material things may simply mean that the cost of
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childbearing relative to material things is lower than in others, or that
their preference ordering of children and material things is different.
In this view there is nothing on welfare grounds that one can infer from
differences in the rates of population growth or savings across societies.
Second, the fact that in low income countries children support their
parents in their old age because other forms of old age security are not
available can be taken to imply that as development proceeds and financial
instrwnents for saving and insurance become available, fertility will
decline.

Although this argument is indeed plausible, in theory it is not

clear whether the motive for having children as providers of old age
security will always lead households to have more children than otherwise
(Srinivasan (1985).

In the model of Becker and Barro (1985), the

fertility of the altruistic household and population growth is only
temporarily reduced by an expansion of social security.
The likely determinants of saving are many and dependency ratio is
only one of them.

It is not surprising that the empirical evidence

linking savings ratios and dependency ratios is not conclusive.

Although

Mason (1985) finds that available evidence from an international cross
section supports the proposition that a higher dependency ratio leads to
lower saving, he himself suggests that the analysis on which this
conclusion is based does not address a number of important issues.

In

particular, there are very few studies of the impact of household
composition on household consumption or saving in developing countries,
and most studies are based on aggregate national level data and not data
from micro household surveys.

Most of the studies take into account only

the resourc~ use implications of having more children and do not take into
account the fact that in poor societies children also participate in labor
force and generate income for the households.
I.

Taking both the resource
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cost and income generation into account,

whether the children are a net

drag on savings is not empirically established conclusively.

Mason

cautiously concludes that the importance of demographic factors to
national savings rates is likely to be the subject of continued debate.
The impact on public investment once again needs to be qualified.
First of all it would be misleading to view expenditures on health and
education as consumption only.

If anything, these expenditures are

mostly, if not wholly, investments in human capital which will enhance the
productivity of the ~orker.

Second, there is very little empirical

evidence which suggests that the share of government spending on health
and education is influenced significantly by the dependency ratio.

Third,

in attempting to assess the effect of dependency ratio on public
expenditures, one has also to take into account that households themselves
devote part of their resources to provide for the health and education of
their offspring.

Disentangling the effect of dependency on public and

private expenditures on education and health in a world in which fertility
decisions themselves are endogenous requires building and estimating
sophisticated econometric models.

To jump to strong policy conclusions

from observed associations between public expenditures and dependency
ratios would be inappropriate.-

In one of the more careful studies,

Schultz (1987) analyzes data from a number of countries on enrollment
rates and spending per student.

He finds no effect of higher population

growth on enrollment rates, while some negative effect on spending per
student is discerned.

He is cautious about placing excessive

interpretation on rather weak results from a cross section.
The argument that more rapid population growth will reduce the steady
state capital per worker-is based on a very simple neoclassical growth
model in which output is a constant return to scale function of capital
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and labor. If workers do not save and capitalists do not consume, then in
the steady state, per capita consumption will be at a maximum.

Further,

the rate of growth of output and the own rate of interest on capital will
equal the rate of growth of the labor force, which in turn is equal to the
rate of growth of population.

It is evident in this model that a more

rapid growth of population will increase the steady state rate of growth
of output in the same proportion, but since the own rate of interest on
capital also goes up by the same proportion, capital per worker and output
per worker will be lower in the new steady state.

Further, for

maintaining capital stock per worker constant along the new steady state
more of the output is devoted to gross investment, so that per capita
consumption is lower.

However, in this framework the rate of growth of

population is exogenous.

If the rate of growth of population is

endogenous and one compared different economies which are along their
steady states, it is not clear that one would observe a negative
association between capital per worker and the equilibrium rate of growth
of population.

In any case, in the simple neoclassical models the economy

is closed, not only with respect to trade and commodities, but also with
respect to capital flows between countries.

Once international capital

flows are allowed, the analysis gets complicated (Deardorff (1985)).
The neoclassical models of growth assume that technical change, if
any, is exogenous to the process of capital accumulation and population
growth.

It has been argued by some that the innovation process itself is

influenced by demographic factors.

In particular, Boserup (1981) has

argued that the technology of cultivation is influenced by population
density.

Simon (1981) argues that the rate of technical progress would be

influenced by population-growth, basing themself on the argument that a
larger population implies a larger amount of knowledge creation and also
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that a larger population achieves economies of scale both in the
production of goods and of knowledge.

He suggests that more rapid growth

of population may in fact enhance the rate of growth of technical
progress.

Binswanger and Pingali (19~4) find some empirical support for

the Boserup thesis.

Unfortunately, carefully conducted empirical studies

of the determinants of technical progress are far too few to be able to
judge the claims of Simon.

The evidence he provides are suggestive but by

no means conclusive.

The impact of changes in the rate of growth of population on income
distribution is another matter where there has been some debate in the
literature.

Although there is some evidence from cross section studies

that income inequality is higher in countries with more rapid rate of
growth of population,. there are a number of serious econometric and
measurement problems that vitiate this analysis.

In theory, one can of

course associate greater income inequality with a more rapid rate of
growth of population.

For example, in the neoclassical growth model

discussed earlier in which the capitalists do not consume and wage earners
do not save, if one compared two economies with access to the same

techno~pgy but with different rates of growth of population, both
economies being on their steady state, the one with the

higher rate of

growth of popula~ion will have a lower wage share and a higher profit
share.

If wage earners are identified with the poor and the capitalists

are identified with the rich, this suggests a deterioration in income
distribution with increases in the rate of growth of population.
Another argument that is often advanced is that the minority of rich
households in poor countries have tended to be those households with low
fertility, while the majority of the poor have high fertility.
Reinforcing this is the association between parental income and
I.
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expenditures on improving child quality through education and health
expenditures.

If the poor not only have more children but also spend less

on investment in human capital on each, then the poor would get poorer and
the rich will get richer over time.
simplistic.

However, this argument is much too

A prior question is an explanation of the differential

fertility between the rich and the poor.

This may merely reflect

differential opportunities for investment. For example, if the poor invest
in children as providers of old age security only because they have no
access to other investments with higher yield, while the rich, because of
their access to investment opportunities, not only invest more in them and
less in their children but also spend more on their children's education,
then the analysis should focus on the reasons for differential access to
investment opportunities and not on the fertility differentials per se
since the latter are endogenous.
explain why

There are several theories attempting to

inequality in wealth distribution is much greater than the

inequality in the income distribution.

Becker's (1967) hypothesizes that

individuals who are more able obtain systematically higher returns to
investment and tend to become wealthier.

Yitzhaki (1986) suggests that if

relative risk aversion is decreasing in wealth (in itself a questionable
proposition), the wealthier individuals will invest in relatively risky
but higher yielding portfolios and as such expected returns per unit of
investment will be increasing in wealth.

Finally, Arrow (1986) shows that

if the cost of acquiring information about the rates of returns to
alternative investment is independent of the amount invested, then the
optimal amount of information purchased by an investor will be an
increasing function of wealth, leading to the distribution of final wealth
being more unequal than initial wealth.
differentials play no role.

In all this, fertility

,j
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Another version of the fertility-based argument is that when
opportunities for fertility reduction become available in a poor society,
the rich make use of them first. Thus, at the early stages of development
the benefit of fertility reduction is concentrated among the upper strata

of society and as such income inequalities would increase.

Of course,

once the poor also avail themselves of the opportunities for fertility
reduction, this process eventually has to reverse itself.

Once again, one

has to ask why it is that the rich make use of the knowledge first.

If

this is because of their greater access to publicly-provided knowledge and
publicly-subsidized means of fertility reduction, then orte ha:s to address·
the issue of differential access issue rather than focus on the resultant
paths of fertility reduction of the two classes over time.

5.

IS THERE A CASE FOR A POPULATION POLICY?
It is evident from historical data from the presently developed

countries ~hat there was a demographic transition from high to low
fertility associated with their economic development.

It is also clear

that the time span over which the transition took place varies among
countries.

If a similar transition can be expected in the developing

countries and if it leads to a level of fertility which is considered
appropriate, and if the time span over which the transition is likely to
take place is also not too long from a social perspective, then one could
argue that there is no reason for changing either the post-transition
fertility or the pace at which the transition takes place through public
policy.

Demeny (1986) for one does not believe that the premises

underlying this assertion are likely to hold.
Families are the institutions whose fertility behavior determines the
aggregate fertility outcome and hence the characteristics of the
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transition.

It is to the literature of the economics of the family that

one has to turn for understanding the determinants of the transition. One
_very influential strand of this literature (Becker (1981)) views the
household as 'producing' the goods and services that it desires using
inputs purchased from the market and the time available to its members.
One major conclusion emerging from this approach is that the fertility
behavior is largely influenced by the trend in the cost of children
relative to other activities that generate household welfare.

The cost of

nurturing a child and investments in its quality are both influenced by
the cost of the mother's time.

To the extent that rising female labor

participation rates and female wages are associated with economic
development, a decline in fertility can be expected.

Offsetting the

tendency for the cost of a child to increase because of the increasing
value of mother's time is the potential contribution to the family income
that a child makes in low-income economies through their participation in
household production and even market activities.

It is thus possible

(Lindert (1980)) that before the cost of a child increases through
economic development, there may be initially a fall in this cost because

of increased opportunities for household production.
Attempts to quantify the effects of rising female wages on fertility
have been made with historical data.

For instance, Paul Schultz (1985)

shows that a quarter of the decline in Swedish fertility from 1860 to 1910

could be accounted for by the rising value of female time.
The interaction between quality of children and the number of
children and its impact on fertility decisions are complex.

The benefits

from having ~hildren and investing in their quality will accrue over a
span of time in the future.

Like all other investments, investment in

children is also a hostage to fortune.

The realization of the benefits of
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such investment depends on the fulfilment of an essentially implicit
contract between children and their parents.

Any threat by a parent on a

child (or vice versa) imposes emotional costs on the parent as well as the
child.

As such, the threats are unlikely to be credible enforcement

mechanisms.

The emphasis on implicit contracts, incentives for evasion

and the consequent need for costly monitoring distinguishes the

"transactions cost approach" to families.

In Pollak's characterization,

this approach "views marriage as a 'governance structure,' emphasizes the
role of 'bargaining' within families, and draws attention to the
advantages and disadvantages of family organization in terms of il)centives
~nd monitoring and to the special roles of 'altruism' and 'family
loyalty'" (Pollak (1985), p. 605).
Unfortunately, in the household production model and the transactions
approach a major role is played by unobserved heterogeneity in household
preferences, technology, inherited traits, etc.

To derive testable

hypotheses about parameters of models involving only observable variables
from either theory involves assumptions about structural relations and
about functional forms of the distribution of latent variables.

As Willis

(1986) points out, "we do not have as yet a body of empirically tested
quantitatively stable estimates of the major behavioral relationships
suggested by the theory," although "we do have a growing capacity to
generate hypotheses about both large and small questions concerning family
behavior and its consequences within a theoretical framework that is a
logically coherent part of the main corpus of neoclassical economic
theory." Until one has a firm empirical explanations of the factors
influencing fertility behavior, attempts to influence such behavior
through public policy are to a considerable extent misplaced.
Demeny forcefully argues that externalities associated with
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individual fertility behaviour are so pervasive that a population problem
will arise in a laissez-faire equilibrium.
population problem exists when

mx

One of his examples, that "a

preference for children diminishes your

access to steak," seems to confuse pecuniary externalities that have only
distributional implications with externalities that arise from
interdependent technologies or preferences.3

In theory, in the presence

of the former, the laissez-faire equilibrium is pareto optimal, and as
such any socially desired redistribution can be brought about through lump
sum transfers. In the presence of the latter the laissez-faire equilibrium
is not pareto optimal.

However, as discussed earlier, the empirical

evidence for a significant presence of the externalities of the latter
kind is not overwhelming and in any case, the optimal policy interventions
to address them are well known, although the feasibility of implementing
them is a matter of debate, particularly from the point of view of
acquiring the information needed to design the optimal policy.

Indeed, if

the information problem is sufficiently severe, there may not be any
feasible policy intervention that improves social welfare compared to a
laissez-faire equilibrium, let alone maximize it.
T9 conclude, most of the arguments for a policy intervention in

private household fertility decisions appear to be based either on an
inappropriate association of undesirable social consequence due to other
distortions in the society with individual fertility choices, or on
associations that cannot be ruled out in theory but are empirically weak,
if not exaggerated.

But, if households are constrained in achieving their

desired fertility because of lack of relevant information about means of
fertility control, appropriate policy intervention to provide such
information may be socially desirable.

A case for publicly-supported

dissemination of family planning information can be made on these grounds.

-24-

FOOTNOTES

*I thank Paul Demeny and Paul Schultz for their comments on an
earlier draft.

lsince an individualistic SWF cannot be at a maximum if the
allocation is not Pareto Optimal (PO), the question then reduces to
whether any arbitrary PO allocation can be sustained as a competitive
equilibrium.

The second welfare theorem of neo-classical welfare

economics asserts that under additional restrictive assumptions, including
convexity of the set of production possibilities and individual
preferences, this is possible provided redistribution of individual
endowments or incomes through lump sum transfers is feasible.

2This section draws on "Population and Food" in D. Gale Johnson and
Ronald Lee (eds.), Population Growth and Economic Development, Washington,
D.C., National Academy of Sciences (forthcoming).

3rn private correspondence Paul Demeny has disputed any such
confusion claiming that "uncoordinated demographic choices are likely to
have an impact on income per capita over time. If the change is for the
worse, lump sum transfers offer no remedy.

The issue is not whether a

Pareto optimum will be achieved--it may well be--nor where that optimum
will lie.

The issue is the size of the [Edgeworth] box: a weightier

affair than mere distribution and optimal allocation."

I am afraid that

the problem is not one of (static) allocation versus dynamic growth.

The

problem is simply a pecuniary externality affecting inter-temporal choice
and resource allocation.

In prnciple, it is a distributional (across

generations) issue amenable to standard remedies albeit involving
intertemporal as well as contemporaneous transfers.
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